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Abstract
As an important gateway to Europe, the Port of Rotterdam is known for its high-quality
facilities and efficiency, but also attracts organised crime groups who use the transat-
lantic legal trade flows to traffic cocaine. Based on a qualitative study, consisting of 73
interviews with public and private actors, an analysis of 10 criminal investigations and
field visits to public and private organisations in the port, this article examines how
organised crime groups involved in cocaine trafficking take advantage of or adapt to the
socio-spatial relations in the Port of Rotterdam. First, we pay attention to which
physical spaces in the port of Rotterdam provide opportunities for cocaine trafficking.
Second, we examine how the occupational and legal environment in which people,
private companies and law enforcement agencies in the port work and interact provide
opportunities for cocaine trafficking. Our findings demonstrate that increased security
measures by both public and private actors directed at physical spaces result in a
displacement to new spaces in and around the port of Rotterdam. Furthermore, the
current socio-spatial relations in the port of Rotterdam also make the role of people on
the inside – referring to a whole range of public and private employees – increasingly
indispensable.
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Introduction
With a total throughput of 469.4 million tonnes and 8.781.185 containers in 2019,
the port of Rotterdam – also known as Europoort – is the largest harbour in Europe,
and the largest in the world outside of Asia (Castelein et al. 2019: 4; Port of
Rotterdam 2019: 2). The port of Rotterdam owes its competitive position to a range
of factors, including its unlimited access for deep-draft vessels, good accessibility
via water, rail and road, high-quality port infrastructure and efficient handling of
containers and bulk goods (Port of Rotterdam 2019: 10; Van der Horst et al. 2019:
191). However, in addition to being known as the most important ‘gateway to
Europe’ (Port of Rotterdam 2019; Jacobs 2000), Rotterdam is also one its main
entry points for cocaine (UNODC 2018: 31–32). In 2019, a record total of 33.732 k
of cocaine was seized in the port of Rotterdam, almost doubling the 2018 record
amount of 19.000 kg (OM 2020).
Throughput, harbour, gateway and entry point all refer back to the etymology of
the word ‘port’, of which the origins can be traced to the Latin ‘porta’, meaning gate,
or the Dutch ‘poort’, meaning door.1 In a recent examination of organized crime
(OC), policing and security in five major seaports, Sergi (2020a: 7) notes that
organized crime groups (OCG) need a ‘door’ to successfully secure the narcotics.
Based on Sergi’s (2020a) empirical description, its meaning could be taken both
literally and figuratively. In addition to a port as such being a ‘door’ for drugs, the
study of Sergi indicates that ‘doors’ represent physical spaces in and around the port
that provide access to the imported drugs. Moreover, a ‘door’ in the port can also be a
metaphorical reference to “someone with a useful function, corruptible for a myriad
of different reasons” (Sergi 2020a: 14) who, because of his or her occupation in the
port, can act as a ‘door’ for OCG.
Previous research has shown that the port of Rotterdam plays a central role in
international drug trafficking with OCG taking advantage of its geographical and
infrastructural conditions (see, among others, Farrell 1998; Fijnaut et al. 1998; Zaitch,
2002; Eski 2011; Eski and Buijt 2016; Ferwerda and Unger 2016). The Netherlands
lends itself for transit crime because of its logistical infrastructure (Kleemans et al. 2002)
and the port of Rotterdam “lends itself for smuggling activities” (Van de Bunt et al.
2014: 323). In this article, we build on these insights and examine the spatiality of
cocaine trafficking in Rotterdam’s seaport based on a qualitative study on the nature and
approach of drug crime in the port of Rotterdam (reference removed for peer review)
and draw on Sergi’s (2020a) usages of the term ‘door’. First, we take a literal reading in
referring to the opportunities for cocaine trafficking provided by physical spaces in the
port of Rotterdam. Secondly, we examine the metaphorical interpretation of a ‘door’ for
drugs by focusing on how the occupational and the legal environment, in which people,
private companies and law enforcement agencies in the port work and interact, provide
opportunities for cocaine trafficking. We will argue that increased security measures by
both public and private actors directed at physical doors result in a displacement to new
spaces in and around the port of Rotterdam. Furthermore, we will argue that the current
1 https://www-oed-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/148090?rskey=6jvCL1&result=3#eid
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socio-spatial relations in the port of Rotterdam imply that OCG redirect their attention to
a whole range of public and private employees making port employees at-risk for
corruption and violence.
This article proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of the literature on
the relation between OC and spaces and flows in ports. Second, we outline the methods
used in the study. In our third section we discuss our empirical results by illustrating, on
the one hand, the opportunities for cocaine smuggling provided by physical spaces in
the port of Rotterdam and, on the other hand, the increased importance of people within
these spaces to successfully import cocaine. The discussion reflects on the implications
of our findings for both future research on organised crime and for public and private
policies addressing OC in seaports.
Organised crime in flows, spaces, and ports
Historically, harbours and seaports have been a décor of organised crime, illustrated by
studies documenting the involvement of the ‘Ndrangheta in the port of Gioia Tauro
(Calabria, Italy) (Arlacchi 1986: 88–116; Sergi and Lavorgna 2016: 80–83) and
racketeering by Italian American OCG at New York’s Fulton Fish Market (Jacobs 1999).
Transnational flows of people and goods have transformed ports to important sites for,
amongst other things, human smuggling and illegal drug trafficking (Staring et al. 2005;
Eski 2011). However, as Calderoni (2019: 177–178) notes, there is some debate on how
OCG have dealt with these transnational flows. Castells (1998: 171), for instance, has
argued that criminal organizations have benefitted from the increasingly global market and
the technological developments in communication and transportation. Similarly, Shelley
(2019: 223) notes a globalization of crime and an international expansion by OCG.
According to Europol’s most recent Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(SOCTA), seven out of tenOCG are active inmore than three countries (Europol 2017: 15).
However, this picture of illicit globalization “obscures asmuch as it reveals. It distorts
and distracts as much as it informs” (Andreas 2011: 405). A mere focus on the
transnational dimension of OCG risks discounting the importance of the local context
in which OCG operate (Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998). According to Hobbs (1998),
building on the work of Robertson (1995), metaphors of globalization fail to grasp “the
complexity of local contextualities” (p. 418), especially when the global is defined as
excluding the local (p. 408). Focusing on the port of Antwerp, Easton (2020: 111) notes
that “glocalized” phenomena (e.g. cocaine trafficking) are inherently international,
while also significantly impacting crime and crime control policies in local ports.
In criminology, the concept of embeddedness is used to signal that OC interacts with
and depends on its local and social surroundings (Van de Bunt et al. 2014). Most studies
on the embeddedness of OC have explored the ‘relational’ aspects, documenting that
OC does not exist in a social vacuum but rather follows the laws of both geographical
and social proximity (Kleemans and Van de Bunt 1999; Staring et al. 2005; Van de Bunt
and Kleemans 2007; Kleemans and De Poot 2008; Van de Bunt et al. 2014). In addition
to relational embeddedness of OC andOCG, Van de Bunt et al. (2014: 323–324) discuss
‘structural’ embeddedness, referring to the importance of branches of industry, occupa-
tions, communities or places. Seaports are considered examples of places where OC can
be structurally embedded, but existing studies have only offered a peripheral glance at
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the ways in which ports impact OC and activities of OCG. Specifically, we argue that
there is a need for a more concise and specific “understanding of who or what the
socially embedded actors are, and in what these actors are actually embedded” (Hess
2004: 166).
In reference to international drug trafficking, structural embeddedness highlights
how ports constitute hubs for legal trade flows that produce opportunities for the illicit
drug trade to flourish (Eski 2011: 418; Eski 2019: 2). When global licit and illicit flows
connect in seaports, specific occupations, professional contacts and the work environ-
ment can serve as a breeding ground for criminal activities (Kleemans and Van de Bunt
2008; Mars 2016). Both legitimate and criminal entrepreneurs benefit from the social
interactions that take place in “seaports, customs offices, and transport firms” and from
the knowledge that is gained about import and export practices (Van de Bunt et al.
2014: 328). However, this structural side of embeddedness is not contingent upon the
occupations as such, but rather determined by the “intersections with legitimate
activities such as the transport of goods, the transhipment of goods in ports” (Van de
Bunt et al. 2014: 328).
In ports, these interfaces between legality and illegality – between OCG and
legitimate occupations and businesses - can take many forms (Passas 2003). In some
cases, OCG hide the contraband among legal products and harm the legal trader in
the process, oftentimes making the products unfit for consumption (e.g. in case of
food). In other examples, the relationships are cooperative with the trader or ship-
ping agent knowingly facilitating the trafficking and thus involving corruption.
Different studies have documented the role of corruption in smuggling operations
in ports (Kostakos and Antonopoulos 2010; Eski & Buijt 2016; Sergi 2020a).
However, as Kleemans (2014: 47) notes, corruption is not a prerequisite for these
transit crimes. A previous study on drug trafficking in the Netherland, based on an
analysis of 15 Dutch cocaine trafficking cases from the late 1990s and early 2000s,
illustrated that corrupting custom officials was deemed unnecessary to successfully
import cocaine because the chances of getting caught red-handed were low
(Kleemans et al. 2002: 94). Moreover, Zaitch (2002: 254), in his ethnographic study
on Colombian cocaine traffickers, also found that most smuggling strategies of
Colombian related cases were geared towards evading controls in ports and did
not involve corruption of Dutch customs or police. However, times seem to have
changed. A recent analysis of 16 Dutch drug trafficking cases via Schiphol airport or
the port of Rotterdam indicated that corruption was frequently used by OCG to
neutralise security checks (Madarie and Kruisbergen 2019: 39). In recent years,
several high-profile corruption cases happened at the respective customs depart-
ments of the ports of Rotterdam (Eski and Buijt 2016).
Our literature overview indicates that seaports facilitate flows of illicit goods
because of their logistical infrastructure and strategic location on major migratory
and trade routes, thus making them ideal spaces for criminal groups to operate in
(Ruggiero 2014: 154). This results in the embeddedness of both criminal activities and
OCG in these spaces (Fijnaut et al. 1998; Van de Bunt et al. 2014; Eski 2015; Madarie
and Kruisbergen 2019; Sergi 2020a, b). Apart from some notable exceptions (Eski
2015; Easton 2020; Sergi 2020a, b), ports have remained understudied as the central
locality of empirical research on OC. Therefore, by drawing on a qualitative study on
cocaine trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, we aim to contribute to an improved
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understanding of how the dynamics of global licit and illicit flows impact local spaces,
occupations, criminal activities, and crime control policies.
Methods
Our analysis uses a qualitative methodology which combines different methods of
data gathering. We started with an extensive review of academic literature, statistics,
policy papers and media reports. Second, 75 individual and 3 group interviews2 were
conducted with representatives of public sector organizations, as well as represen-
tatives of private companies that have a direct relationship with the port of Rotter-
dam. Most of the interviews took place in the Netherlands, but we also interviewed
representatives of public and private sector organizations during visits to Antwerp
and Hamburg as well as via videoconferencing with key informants in Latin Amer-
ica. In addition, we visited various public authorities and private companies in the
ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg and attended meetings and training
sessions of relevance to the control of drug trafficking and other crimes in the port.
These working visits and observations occurred between January 2018 and
March 2019 and allowed gaining insights into the actual working methods and
situational differences of different actors.
Third, we were granted permission by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service to study
criminal investigations into the trafficking of cocaine in the port of Rotterdam. In absence
of a central registry, a snowball method based on a consultation of experts working at the
police and the Public Prosecution Service led to a selection of 10 cases with a wide range
of smuggling methods (modus operandi) and partnerships. These investigations occurred
between 2013 and 2017. More recent cases were excluded because trial was pending.
These police investigations contain a wealth of information – sometimes thousands of
pages per case - because of the use of special investigative methods, such as wired
taps, IP taps, and interrogations. An analytical framework was used to systematize
the data-analysis. The cases are listed in Table 1. Because of possible recognizability
and traceability of suspects, companies or specific locations, the criminal investiga-
tions bear a fictitious name and some elements of our description are presented at an
aggregated level.
Using these different methods provided us with complementary perspectives
about cocaine trafficking in the port of Rotterdam. The police investigations shed
light on the spaces used by OCG to import cocaine, whereas the interviews and
observations provided insight into the lived experience of policing cocaine traffick-
ing in the port of Rotterdam. After familiarization with the empirical data, two
researchers started with reviewing the data and assigning initial thematic codes
based on the conceptual framework and research questions across the dataset in
Atlas.ti 8 for the central themes. During this deductive process, they discussed and
realigned their interpretation and use of codes with other members of the research
2 To guarantee the confidentiality of the interviews, each respondent received a code and a general reference to
the employing organization or company. We refrained from mentioning the function or work experience of the
respondent, unless their anonymity was not at stake and the quotation could gain in significance. For the sake
of readability, some quotes have been shortened and linguistically improved without, of course, compromising
on meaning. Most were translated from Dutch to English, some from German to English.
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team. The two initial coders then continued the analysis by an inductive open coding
strategy, identifying the underlying and new themes that came out of the data. To
ensure consistency within each theme and across the dataset and thereby increasing
reliability of the analysis, this last coding strategy was also reviewed by the research
team (Miles and Huberman 1994: 59–61).
Research setting
From a small medieval city at the mouth of the river Maas, Rotterdam has transformed
into a global city, with its development inextricably linked to the development of the
port (Eski 2015: 28–30). Throughout most of Rotterdam’s history, “waterfronts and
harbours were located in the heart of the city or its nearby peripheries” (Kermani et al.
2020: 347), making the port and the city indistinguishable. To answer to the growing
need for large-scale modernized terminals and port facilities with excellent access to
sea, road and rail transport and minimal pollution for nearby residential areas, the port
of Rotterdam expanded westward (to the sea) with the development of the areas
Europoort and Maasvlakte I and II (Aarts et al. 2012: 7). This is visible in Map 1:
Port of Rotterdam. Most of the (container) terminals left the original city ports for state-
of-the-art facilities at the deep-water quays of the Maasvlakte. Nowadays, the port of
Rotterdam operates 24/7 and stretches 42 km from the city centre all the way to
Table 1 Overview of cases
Fictitious
name
Short description of the case Start police
investigation
Dodger Three people are suspected of gaining unauthorized access to a container terminal
in the Waalhaven with the (suspected) aim of removing narcotics
2014
Fiddly A planner who works for a container terminal is suspected of facilitating the
trafficking in narcotics by, among other things, moving containers
2016
Jackstaff A network of people suspected of putting a large amount of narcotics overboard
and securing them off the coast of Zeeland
2013
Jackstay Money laundering investigation focused on the unexplained wealth of several
suspects in the Jackstaff case
2014
Lutchet Family network suspected of importing narcotics by attaching these to the ship,
under the waterline, and securing them off the coast of the United Kingdom
2014
Mizzenmast An organised crime network is suspected of large scale import of narcotics via
the port of Rotterdam
2016
Moonraker Suspect who was apprehended with a bag of narcotics onboard a ship in the
Waalhaven
2014
Oakum A local Rotterdam network is suspected of several successful rip-offs and rip-off
attempts at Maasvlakte container terminals
2013
Scuttlebutt Employees of a fruit import company in the Rotterdam area are suspected of
importing narcotics by using the company they work for
2016
Weatherly A criminal network made use of the services of a corrupt customs officer to help
clear large quantities of narcotics without inspection
2014
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reclaimed land in the North Sea, about 12.500 ha and 77 km of quays (Port of
Rotterdam, 2020). Consequently, the port of Rotterdam has two faces: the historically
developed ports close to the city centre and the modern ports on the Maasvlakte.
Results
In this section, we examine how organised crime groups involved in cocaine trafficking
take advantage of or adapt to the socio-spatial relations in the Port of Rotterdam. We
analyse how structural embeddedness plays a role (Van de Bunt et al. 2014) and continue
the above-mentioned metaphor of ‘doors’ to the port (Sergi, 2020a). First, we focus on
which physical spaces provide opportunities for cocaine trafficking. Second, we emphasise
the importance of access to these spaces and to information by way of people on the inside.
Fruit warehouses, empty depots and container terminals as ‘doors’
OCG make use of different drugs smuggling methods: hidden in hollowed out fruits,
banana boxes, engines or other products; concealed in the walls, ceilings or floors of
containers; hidden in the inspection hatches of the engine compartment of reefers
(refrigerated containers); dropped off at sea after being hidden on board of large sea-
vessels; smuggled underneath the waterline in intricate constructions welded to ships;
packed in carryalls placed near the doors of containers, which are then taken out of the
container and driven off the terminal (so called ‘rip-off’ method) (Eski and Buijt 2016:
373; Boerman et al. 2017: 36; Colman 2018: 131). This non-exhaustive overview of
modus operandi of cocaine trafficking shows that OCG potentially use a wide array of
maritime smuggling methods to (ab)use Rotterdam’s licit trade flows. In an area scan
by the Rotterdam Seaport Police (2018: 26) and during our interviews it was noted that
the rip-off method and the method of hiding cocaine in the frame or engine compart-
ment of reefer containers were popular methods.
Because Rotterdam is the first port of call for most shipping lines from Latin
America, these trade routes are Europe’s link with the primary source and transit
Map 1 Port of Rotterdam (Source: Google Maps, permission for use in line with https://www.google.com/
permissions/geoguidelines/, annotations made by authors)
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countries for cocaine. Thus, transatlantic shipping lines define Rotterdam’s drug
trafficking problem:
“What you mainly see is that - and granted I probably don’t know everything -
but the branches that are most vulnerable for drug trafficking are mainly the
container terminals. Recently, also the empty depots and fruit and vegetables
[warehouses] could be added to that list. Ultimately, that has to do with the
countries of origin, of course”. (R71)
The choice of smuggling method determines which spaces in the port of Rotterdam are
confronted with cocaine trafficking. Based on the most popular modus operandi used by
OCG in Rotterdam, three physical ‘doors’ for the trafficking of cocaine in the port of
Rotterdam can be distinguished: fruit warehouses, empty depots, and container terminals.
First, fruit terminals and warehouses – predominantly located in the Rotterdam city
ports, particularly theMerwehaven and Vierhavens areas – are contemporary spaces that
provide opportunities for cocaine trafficking. Fruit is often used to smuggle drugs, hidden
within the pallets, boxes or fruit itself. One of the police investigations illustrates this:
“On [date], an employee discovered that the lock of the entrance door to the
storage facility has disappeared and that about 30 boxes have been moved from
the rear row in rack M. An investigation has shown that four boxes have a lighter
weight compared to the bill of lading and about 40 kilograms of bananas are
missing.” (Mizzenmast case)
This case shows how the local handling of fruit results in a ‘door’: a specific spatial
concentration of opportunities for the trafficking of cocaine. Burglars enter these fruit
warehouses to secure the drugs, often rendering some of the product unfit for con-
sumption. However, the problems with cocaine trafficking via fruit import also extend
beyond the port itself, reaching terminals and warehouses in the hinterland after the
drugs have successfully passed through the port.
Second, the so-called empty depots are important spaces that provide opportunities
for cocaine trafficking. Empty depots store used containers and provide container
cleaning and repair services. The 22 container depots in and around the port of
Rotterdam cover over 120 ha. Our respondents indicate that empty depots are increas-
ingly used by OCG to secure cocaine from the frames of containers:
“The empty depots are good examples. You also have one in Waalhaven. (...)
Every time we are there, we find new holes in the fences and tools to demolish
entire containers. Not too long ago, we arrested a lot of people there and things
got so heated that a colleague had to draw his firearm. We arrested someone who
is a well-known [picker].3 (R52).
In general, the security measures at these empty depots are limited, in some cases even
absent. Most operate only during the day, leaving the locations practically empty at
night. According to one of our respondents, security is not considered an issue
3 Dutch word ‘uithaler’ was used.
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“because they store empty containers, who comes to steal an empty container?” (R17).
Or as a manager of a container depot explained:
“We don't have surveillance. It is open. It is an open area, because we store empty
containers. Once there is a load, it will still be closed ground. (…) If you have an
ISPS4 status or AEO5 status, the area needs to be closed but we have neither, so it
is freely accessible. Everyone can get on and off the depot.” (R20)
This specific container depot has recently moved to a location on a container terminal
and is therefore also subject to both ISPS and AEO regulations. The opportunities for
drug trafficking regarding access to the location has changed, which our respondent
welcomed, although “(they) can still break in of course, but there are more cameras
and there are security guards” (R20).
In some cases, empty depots also play a role in providing OCG access to
neighbouring container terminals – the third physical ‘door’ – as is illustrated in one
of the police investigations:
“Company A is a container terminal with direct access to the sea in the city port
of Rotterdam., It has an annual transshipment capacity of more than 1,000,000
TEU6 and has 1500 reefer connections. The terminal has three piers, each 800
meters long. Generally, sea-bound vessels from South and Central America arrive
at company A on Friday after which the containers are transferred to the reefer
stack on one of the piers. During the weekends, the reefer containers remain at the
terminal because road transports starts on Monday after 3:00 AM. The reefer
stack is almost immediately adjacent to the empty depot of company B, separated
only by a fence and a roadway. Regularly, intruders cut holes in this fence in
order to get into the stack and remove cocaine from the reefers.” (Dodger case)
Whereas the terminals in the city ports offer specific opportunities for OCG because
these sites are located near the city centre, the Maasvlakte appeals to cocaine smugglers
because it offers a certain level of anonymity and an ideal escape route via the A15
motorway. However, in contrast to the container sites in the city ports, the daily
container volume handled at Maasvlakte terminals is significantly higher, resulting in
long stacks of almost three kilometres. Moreover, as the following case illustrates, the
way these container terminals work provides additional challenges for OCG using the
rip-off modus operandi:
“To get to a container in stack D at container terminal C, an individual must
deviate from the road used by workers and drive or walk through a carrier area
that has forklifts of 12 meters high. For safety reasons, it is strictly forbidden to
walk or drive in a car in this area. Container stack D can be reached after passing
4 International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) certification is required to receive seafaring cargo ships
over 500 TEU, passengers ships on international voyage or mobile drilling platforms.
5 Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) certification is awarded by EU customs organizations as a recogni-
tion of a company’s security standards.
6 TEU or 20-ft equivalent unit describes the capacity of containers and vessels.
Trends in Organized Crime
the carrier area, but for safety reasons only reefer mechanics can enter stack D.”
(Oakum case).
In general, the container terminals on the Maasvlakte have implemented more and
better crime prevention measures through environmental design compared to the
container terminals in the city ports. These measures include entrance gates, qualified
security guards in the porter’s lodge, surveillance vehicles on site and extensive
camera surveillance, making these spaces less accessible for OCG. These container
terminals, represented by their security officers, also share information on cases and
security measures in the six-weekly meetings of the Information Sharing Centre,7 a
private-public cooperation which also brings the Seaport Police and Customs around
the table.
Another substantial difference between the city ports and the terminals on the
Maasvlakte II is the automation of logistical processes. According to some of our
respondents, there are only a few incidents related to cocaine trafficking at these
terminals, because people cannot access the container stacks within this “fully fenced
and high-tech environment” (R65). However, the automatized terminals might create
new vulnerabilities for hacking by criminal organizations. Leukfeldt et al. (2019: 334)
indeed describe a drug trafficking case of hackers who aided in locating and picking-up
containers in a port before the regular transport company reached the cargo. Although
respondents raised it as a potential opportunity,8 we did not encounter hacking of
business processes in the case files nor were concrete cases of hacking to facilitate drug
trafficking mentioned during the interviews.
Employees of public and private port organisations (re)creating ‘doors’
In the previous section, we showed how cocaine traffickers make use of opportuni-
ties provided by legal trade flows and use different ‘physical doors’ depending on
the smuggling methods. Knowledge about logistical processes in the port as well as
familiarity with security measures at port sites are paramount for OCG to success-
fully make use of the opportunities provided by spaces such as terminals, empty-
depots and warehouses in the port of Rotterdam. Because of break-ins, damaged
fences and intruders in the stacks, many of these locations have sharpened their
security measures, in an attempt to close these doors for OCG. However, OCG still
manage to get a foot in the door, specifically by redirecting their focus to port
employees.
First, to keep unauthorized people out, many port sites have checks at the entrance
gate. However, many people have legitimate reasons to access these ports: a wide range
of employees of port companies, including but not limited to lashers, surveyors,
stevedores, straddle carrier drivers, technicians, and truck drivers, as well as different
government agencies and semi-public actors, like the boatsmen and pilots. Most are
granted access with personalised, sometimes biometrical, access cards. For OCG, as
7 The public and private partners signed a legal agreement (‘convenant’) to formalize this partnership.
8 They illustrated the potential vulnerability by referring to the worldwide ransomware attack of 27 June 2017
which shut down 17 APM-Maersk container terminals, including two in Rotterdam (Bremmer and Van Heel
2017).
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different respondents noted, these access cards are a sought-after commodity, estimat-
ing their value between 5.000 and 15.000 euro. In the Oakum police investigation,
several local suspects actively searched for port employees or people with port access
cards within their social networks such as the Rotterdam neighbourhoods they grew up
or resided in. The core members of the criminal network paid these port employees
about 8.000 euro for an access card. Furthermore, they also used other ways to enter the
gated terminals:
“The services of M., K’s brother in law, are used. M. is a shift leader at [company
in the port], which is located next to the [container terminal]. The sites are
connected by a so-called internal lane, solely intended for commercial vehicles
and so-called container trains. This internal lane has barriers to prevent access
from the public road. [Company name] has two company cars, equipped with
transponders that give access to the internal lane. This internal lane provides
access to the business site of the [container terminal] but also gets you close to the
container stack. These company cars may only be used by shift leaders and their
superiors. They have two seats in the front and a cargo box without windows in
the back.” (Oakum case)
Moreover, our respondents indicated that some OCG gain access to port sites by using
forged vehicles that closely resemble company cars and even “a customs vehicle was
duplicated” (R52). Additionally, members of OCG wear clothing of port employees,
including reflective vests, safety helmets and overalls with logos of the companies. In
the Mizzenmast case, clothing from different port companies was found during a search
at a suspect’s house. Aware of these practices, a maritime pilot told us that he burns his
company clothing instead of throwing them out in the trash after they are replaced with
new ones.
Often, entering these locations by means of access cards, forged vehicles or clothing
alone does not guarantee that OCG will be successful in securing the cocaine. Because
of the size of the Maasvlakte sites, locating a container with a specific number is
searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Therefore, in addition to physical
access to locations, knowledge is key as one of the interviewees (R05) noted: “You
must have information. It’s always about access.”. Many port employees have access to
the specific number and location of containers during its handling. In the container
logistics sector, it is seen as a customer service that containers can be followed via a
track and trace system – even down to the level of the row and height in the stacks. For
some occupations in the port, this (potential) access to stack information and additional
knowledge about the logistics process, constitutes an important vulnerability, as one of
our respondents noted:
“If you already have access to the system [with information about cargo and stack
information], then you actually already have a lot. (…) There are so many
possibilities to obtain that information. As a result, you also have that very large
group that could be vulnerable and that often also means that many of those
employees at a terminal actually fall into this at-risk group, right?” (R10)
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Earlier studies on drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam already illustrated that a
substantial numbers of actors in the supply chain – including planners, shippers,
drivers, freight forwarders, and different employees who process documents (e.g. bill
of lading) – can access systems with information about the whereabouts of containers
(Smits 2014: 26; Eski and Buijt 2016). However, accessing this information is not a
prerequisite to perform specific jobs, like one of the respondents stated: “If I am a
crane operator or maintenance engineer or doorman, why do I have to know where
that container is?” (R29). For OCG, this information is very valuable and something
they actively pursue. Transport company employees who were interviewed, disclosed
that they had been approached by OCG, either for the theft of cargo or for locating
drugs.
During the interviews, our respondents noted that in virtually every case of drug
trafficking in the port of Rotterdam, they came across corruption by employees of either
public or private port organisations. One respondent simply said the organization of
drug trafficking “is always with someone on the inside” (R28). Similarly, there was an
indication of corruption in all the police investigations we studied, either passively by
passing on information about the whereabouts of ships or containers or, more actively,
by lending out their access cards or otherwise facilitating access. In the Mizzenmast
case, one of the suspects actively searches for contacts in a fruit import company,
whereas in the Weatherly case several fruit companies play an essential role in the
narcotics trafficking although it remains unclear whether these companies or their
employees were knowingly involved. Case Scuttlebutt makes clear how essential the
knowledge, contacts and expertise of these facilitators are: an employee of a fruit
import company attempts to smuggle narcotics from Central America by using existing
trade lines to the Netherlands. Furthermore, the Mizzenmast case illustrates that port
employees have vital insights into how to bypass site security or government supervi-
sion, as is indicated by the following wiretapped conversation between an employee of
a container terminal (E) and a suspect (F):
“E: For example, if you are on our port site and you want to leave, you also have
to drive through that scan.
F: Seriously?
E: Yes, yes, yes, soon there will be mobile scans on the site that you have to pass.
The trucks must go through, everything that enters the site must go through. It’s
not ready yet, but I'll let you know” (Mizzenmast case)
Based on frequent contacts with port employees, either in person or by phone, the
suspect was kept informed about the construction of scans, but also about the specific
container handling procedures at different terminals.
The Fiddly case offers an example of a port employee who plays an even more active
role to make sure cocaine passes through the port of Rotterdam. As a planner working at
a large container terminal in the Maasvlakte, this port employee was informed about
upcoming inspections by the custom department. One day, the planner receives an e-
mail about a planned rip-off inspection taking place, including an overview of the
specific containers that will be checked. During the police investigation, it became clear
that the planner used his personal account to move a specific container to a different
stack, outside of the area with containers selected for customs control. However, this
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manoeuvre by the planner did not prevent the inspection by the custom department, it
just delayed the process. During the check, 700 kg of cocaine were found in the
container that was relocated by the planner. A similar but this time public sector port
employee featured in the Weatherly case: a customs officer, working as a selector at the
pre-arrival department. As the human factor in the container selection process, the
customs officer was able to influence which containers should be checked and in what
manner: either on paper, by scan or by way of a physical inspection. Over the course of
several months, he would earn a generous fee by checking the whereabouts and status of
specific containers and by making sure some would be kept out of inspection, for
instance by changing the containers’ status in the customs systems. Moreover, because
of his occupation, the main suspect had insights into the risk profiles that underlie the
selection process of the customs department, information he allegedly sharedwith OCG.
These examples illustrate that corruption of port employees is essential for OCG,
especially to reopen or bypass closed physical doors or to use the spaces to get a foot in
the door in the port of Rotterdam. In some of the cases we studied, we see OCG and port
employees cooperating with the latter financially profiting from their involvement.
However, our respondents also mentioned the use of violence and intimidation towards
port employees. Although this use of violence was often mentioned during our inter-
views and during the training sessions for private port employees we attended, we only
came across one threat of violence in one of the police investigations we studied. In the
Dodger case, one of the main suspects claimed that he cooperated with an OCG by
giving information about the port company he worked for because he was threatened at
gun point.
Discussion
In this article, we examined the spatiality of cocaine trafficking in the port of Rotterdam.
Our study illustrates that intertwining global licit and illicit flows impact specific
localities and businesses in Rotterdam’s harbour area. Although cocaine traffickers ride
along with the legal trade flows, their choices of routes and locations to enter ports are
dependent on the supervision and the control in the overall port area as well as in specific
locations within the ports (cf. Sergi 2020b: 13–14). Specifically, drawing on Sergi’s
(2020a) use of the term ‘door’, we identified three spaces in the port of Rotterdam that
are used by OCG as physical ‘doors’ to successfully import cocaine: fruit warehouses,
empty depots and container terminals. These port companies are specific examples of
places where OC is structurally embedded, both in terms of the location and situational
conditions and in terms of the occupations that frequent these spaces (Van de Bunt et al.
2014). We demonstrated that these three spaces go hand in hand with specific modus
operandi of hiding narcotics within fruit, fruit boxes or pallets (fruit warehouses), hiding
in walls, ceilings or floors of containers or engine compartments of reefers (empty
depots) and rip-off (container terminals). Because our methodology consisted of
analysing police investigations and interviewing public and private actors, it should be
noted that these three are by no means the only physical ‘doors’ nor the only modus
operandi used by OCG to import cocaine via the port of Rotterdam. Other research
methods, for instance interviewing active, convicted or former cocaine traffickers, could
shed light on opportunities provided by other physical locations.
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Moreover, these geographic locations are by no means fixed spaces, but rather,
concordant with Sergi’s (2020a: 14) main findings, a temporary outcome of an arms
race between OCG and public and private actors in the port of Rotterdam. Although
situational measures attempt to take away opportunities for drug trafficking, not all
vulnerabilities and opportunities for drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam can
adequately be addressed. For instance, our respondents noted that the emergence of
empty depots as ‘doors’ might have been a result of increased safety measures on
container terminal sites. Raising barriers for one spatial opportunity, therefore, might
lead to OCG trying to get a foot in the door in other parts of the port in Rotterdam.
Furthermore, our study suggests that an even more problematic and unforeseen side
effect might not just be geographic displacement of ‘doors’ for cocaine trafficking, but
rather a shift towards the port employees. A wide range of port employees have
physical access to port sites, an understanding of the intricacies of port logistics, as
well as detailed knowledge about container numbers and locations and security mea-
sures and supervision. In all the police investigations we studied, port employees,
working either for port companies or government agencies, were involved in cocaine
trafficking. As we illustrated, these examples include port employees actively assisting
OCG by bypassing security checks or relocating containers, but we also came across
more passive ways of facilitating OCG by, for instance, providing information or
access cards. Public and private organizations in the port of Rotterdam have raised
barriers for drugs trafficking by means of increased supervision and automation of the
logistics process, but this has also made it more difficult for OCG to import cocaine
without having a foot in the door in these same organizations. Future research should
further scrutinize these relationships between OCG and port employees, in addition to
shedding more light on the ways in which port employees get involved with and
approached by OCG.
Finally, global trade flows undoubtedly impact cocaine traffickers on a macro level,
but our analysis shows how there are variations in opportunities within and between
physical locations in local ports depending on the private security measures or the
public supervision, or the absence thereof. Areas in the port of Rotterdam which are
located closer to the city face different challenges regarding cocaine trafficking than
port areas on the Maasvlakte. This is a result of a combination of the physical lay-out of
the port area, its proximity to the city, the type of economic activity and the security
measures that are in place. Hence, the prevention and control of cocaine trafficking
requires a tailored approach based on this combination of factors. Besides, we men-
tioned that security officers of container terminals, Seaport Police and Customs meet in
the Information Sharing Centre. This public-private network allowed coordinating
security measures at the terminals but might have resulted in smugglers choosing other
modus operandi to secure their cocaine and thus targeting other port facilities, later in
the logistical process (i.e. empty depots and warehouses). Therefore, alignment be-
tween different areas within the same port can avoid that increased security measures in
one port space result in increased cocaine trafficking in another. However, these
dynamics of displacement are not limited to the port of Rotterdam. With opportunities
to successfully import cocaine into the port of Rotterdam changing because of situa-
tional crime prevention measures, other harbours in the vicinity, like the port of
Antwerp (De Middeleer et al. 2018: 261; Easton 2020), Hamburg (Eski 2015), or other
ports in Europe might be targeted by OCG. Equally, increased security measures in
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other European ports might impact the import of cocaine in Rotterdam. This implies
that communication between ports about security measures - even when they compete
for maritime-based trade – can foster better coordination of prevention and control
policies for drug trafficking. Alignment between port security policies within and
between ports can avoid a fragmented perspective and an unlevel playing field which
play into the hands of OCG (Sergi 2020a). However, the extent to which this alignment
can be achieved depends on how economic and security interests are weighed. Efforts
to close doors through improved physical and digital security measures as well as
attention for screening, awareness and resilience of public and private port employees
puts pressure on the efficiency of the logistical process while answering to societal
expectations of increased engagement with security in ports.
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